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Research has shown that neoliberal economic policies may increase violence. In this study we extend
this logic to create a “neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis.” We test this hypothesis using two global
measures of neoliberalism (the Economic Freedom of the World Index and the Index of Economic
Freedom) and 2014 homicide rates for 142 nations. Regression analysis provides little support for
the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis using the global indexes. However, when examining factors
that make up these indexes we discover that as size of government and tax burden become more neo-
liberal across nations, homicide rates increase. A post hoc exploratory analysis suggests that the
association between government size, spending, taxes, and homicide is largely indirect and manifests
through economic inequality and poverty. That is, neoliberal government policies appear to increase
poverty and inequality which, in turn, lead to higher rates of homicide. We situate our findings
within the broader literature on neoliberalism and violence and suggest directions for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
The cross-national correlates of homicide have been extensively studied by social scien-
tists (e.g., Chamlin and Cochran 2006; Chamlin and John 2007; Messner, Raffalovich,
and Shrock 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Nivette 2011; Pridemore 2008, 2002;
Pridemore and Trent 2010). A great deal of this literature focuses on political, economic
structural changes captured by measures of modernization (e.g., Altheimer 2008;
Antonaccio and Tittle 2007; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Lafree and Tseloni 2006),
deprivation (e.g., Pridemore 2008, 2011), and political structure (e.g., Krahn, Hartnagel,
and Gartrell 1986; Lafree and Tseloni 2006; Li 1995). Notably absent from these cross-
national homicide studies is an empirical test of the effects of neoliberalism, an eco-
nomic philosophy that has dominated national and international policy agendas for the
last 40 years (Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is characterized by a reduction in govern-
ment spending and free trade as well as privatization, deregulation, and other measures
designed to increase the importance of the private sector in the economy (Harvey 2005;
Kotz 2008). An expanding literature increasingly documents various adverse social con-
sequences of neoliberal policies (Chomsky 1999; Duggan 2012; Giroux 2004; Harvey
2005). It is within this critical framework that we suggest neoliberalism may generate
homicide. In particular, we hypothesize that nations that rank higher on neoliberal indi-
cators will also tend to have elevated levels of homicide.
We measure neoliberalism cross-nationally using two unique indexes: the Economic
Freedom World Index (EFWI) and the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). Both indexes are
often used synonymously with neoliberalism, and both measure different components of the
concept. As of yet, however, these indicators have not been used as predictors of cross-
national homicide rates. Thus, the current study represents the first attempt to examine the
complex relationship between a nation’s adoption of neoliberalism practices and homicide by
using the EFWI and IEF to predict homicide rates.
There are three main reasons why neoliberalism may influence homicide rates cross-
nationally. First, neoliberalism stresses the importance of personal responsibility and there-
fore fosters a historically unique form of competitive individualism (Braedley and Luxton
2010). As a result, these policies can justify high levels of unemployment and decreased
wages as means of increasing economic competition. Simultaneously, elevated unemploy-
ment and low wages produce a social and cultural context for high rates of interpersonal vio-
lence because large numbers of individuals do not have access to living wages and/or are
socialized in geographical areas that are excluded from the conventional labor market (e.g.,
see Anderson 2000). Second, the neoliberal emphasis on economic freedom may create a
condition where institutions engaged in socialization falter and socialization is attenuated
(Allon 2011), which might affect homicide through related processes such as collective effi-
cacy at the community level (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001). Thus, homicide
may increase when the economic functions of social institutions are more valued than their
social control functions (Gordon 2001; Messner and Rosenfeld 2012; Passas 2000). Third,
neoliberal policies have been associated with cuts to welfare and the elimination of programs
that are ideologically opposed to individual responsibility and freedom (Chomsky 1999).
Thus, neoliberal policies undermine the welfare state by limiting social welfare programs and
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reducing spending that may directly benefit economically marginalized populations (Rodwan
and Cingranelli 2006). These types of cuts are thought to stimulate economic inequality and
poverty, which have long been associated with violent crime such as homicide (Pratt and
Godsey 2003). It is for these three reasons that we set out to theoretically and empirically
scrutinize the relationship between neoliberalism and homicide by testing a neoliberalism-
homicide hypothesis in the hopes of contributing to the general debate about its glo-
bal impact.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. First, we review the existing lit-
erature on cross-national explanations of homicide. We focus on this past cross-national
research since theoretical concepts associated with these other theories are also often related
to concepts that appear in critical discussions of neoliberalism; in addition, we seek to pro-
vide context for the control variables used in our analysis of neoliberalism and homicide.
Second, we give a brief overview of neoliberalism to contextualize our neoliberalism-homi-
cide hypothesis. Third, we theoretically link the concept of neoliberalism to violence and
homicide. Fourth, we discuss our methodology and report results of multivariate analysis that
tests the relationship between neoliberalism and homicide rates. Finally, we situate our find-
ings in the literature and suggest directions for future research.
CROSS-NATIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF HOMICIDE
A significant literature examines the correlates of cross-national homicide (Chamlin and
Cochran 2006; Chamlin and John 2007; Messner et al. 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997;
Nivette 2011; Pridemore 2008, 2002; Pridemore and Trent 2010), and many different variables
have been used in the prediction of cross-national homicide rates. In this brief review we focus
primarily on previously established explanations of cross-national homicide rates.
Reviews of the cross-national crime literature (Nivette 2011; Pridemore and Trent
2010) indicate that one of the primary correlates of cross-national homicide includes
measures of economic development (e.g., gross domestic product [GDP], gross national
product [GNP], and gross national income [GNI]; see Altheimer 2008; Antonaccio and
Tittle 2007; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Lafree and Tseloni 2006). These indicators
are common in models predicting cross-national homicide and are based on the assump-
tion that economic development drives the modernization process, which in turn produces
forms of social disorganization and disruptions in social control that may generate crime.
Previous literature indicates that the modernization thesis is a common theoretical per-
spective informing comparative studies of crime (Nivette 2011; Ouimet 2012; Pridemore
and Trent 2010; Shelley 1981). The modernization process can be related to crime in a
number of ways, including the disruption of traditional forms of social control (Robbins
and Pettinicchio 2012); the expansion of opportunities for crime (Uludag et al. 2009); the
generation of social and economic changes that produce social disorganization and con-
flict, including population heterogeneity (Antonaccio and Tittle 2007; Gartner 1990); the
production of either absolute or relative deprivation (Chamlin and Cochran 2006;
Pridemore 2008); and an increase in anomie and social strain (Bjerregaard and Cochran
2008; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997).
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Pridemore and Trent (2010) suggest that empirical tests of various indicators of modern-
ization remain inconsistent across studies and have demonstrated positive (e.g., Wilson
1995), negative (e.g., Altheimer 2008; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Neapolitan 1998;
Stamatel 2009), or null (e.g., Bennett 1991; He et al. 2003; Pridemore 2008) relationships to
crime. The most common indicators of the level of modernization in the cross-national crime
literature are GNP/GDP/GNI (e.g., Altheimer 2008; Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Stamatel
2009), energy consumption (e.g., Avison and Loring 1986; Conklin and Simpson 1985), and
indexes of modernization/development that usually include some combination of the follow-
ing variables: education enrollment, electricity consumption, infant mortality, GDP, life
expectancy, literacy rates, population aged 15–24, number of telephone lines, and urbaniza-
tion (e.g., Antonaccio and Tittle 2007; Chamlin and Cochran 2006; Messner et al. 2002).
Measures of deprivation have often been linked with cross-national homicide rates. Many
scholars have found that relative deprivation, or the lack of resources compared with others
in that society, has a significant positive relationship with cross-national homicide rates.
Relative deprivation is most often measured with the Gini index, an indicator of within-
nation income inequality (e.g., Avison and Loring 1986; Barber 2006; Bjerregaard and
Cochran 2008; Chamlin and Cochran 2006). Absolute deprivation, or living in poverty, has
also been linked with homicide rates (Pridemore 2008, 2011).
Some researchers have suggested that the type and effectiveness of a government within a
nation is related to homicide rates. Employing indicators of the level of democracy as a
proxy for government type, scholars have found an inconsistent relationship between the
level of democracy and homicide rates (Krahn, Hartnagel, and Gartrell 1986; Lafree and
Tseloni 2006; Li 1995). However, numerous previous studies have demonstrated that govern-
ment corruption and the degree of trust government elicits in the population is associated
with higher homicide rates (Antonaccio and Tittle 2007; Roth 2009; Stretesky, Long, and
Lynch 2017), while others (Lim, Bond, and Bond 2005) failed to find a relationship between
corruption and homicide.
Studies of cross-national homicide have also examined the potential role of social institutions
in society. Research on institutional anomie theory (IAT), a neo-Marxist explanation of crime in
the United States developed by Messner and Rosenfeld (2012), is used in a cross-national con-
text. In particular, IAT theorists argue that free market mechanisms of capitalism weaken none-
conomic institutions that act to reduce crime in society. With respect to cross-national homicide
this has been tested by researchers such as Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008), who examined
whether the potential relationship between economic indicators and homicide rates is mediated
or moderated by variables that measure the health of social institutions, such as the level of fam-
ily disruption, illiteracy rates, pupil-to-teacher ratios, and voter turnout among 46 nations.
Consistent with IAT arguments by Messner and Rosenfeld, the researchers discovered that the
health of social institutions both mediated and moderated the relationship between economic
conditions and homicide (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008: 39). Importantly, Bjerregaard and
Cochran (2008) also conceptualized the Index of Economic Freedom as an economic indicator,
similar to their measures of economic inequality and unemployment. However, as we suggest,
this index is better conceptualized as a distinct indicator of neoliberalism.
Variables that are often associated with the routine activities perspective (Cohen and
Felson 1979), including unemployment (He et al. 2003; Krohn 1976; Lim, Bond, and Bond
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2005; Wilson 2001) and degree of urbanization (Altheimer 2008; Bennett 1991; Cole and
Gramajo 2009), have also been studied in relation to cross-national homicide rates. In the
case of each of these variables the findings are inconsistent with regard to the strength and
direction of their relationship with homicide rates. A few researchers have also included
measures of deterrence in studies of homicide, including using the size of the police force in
an area as a predictor of homicide rates (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; McDonald
1976), and found no association between these variables.
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that researchers have employed a variety of
social, economic, and political indicators to estimate cross-national homicide rates. However,
the existing body of quantitative cross-national studies of homicide neglect an important fea-
ture of modern times—neoliberalism. The neoliberal agenda has dominated much of the pol-
icy discussions and mandates throughout the world during the last 40 years. In order to better
understand cross-national homicide rates, we argue that it is crucial to consider the role of
neoliberalism and its potential impact on homicide.
NEOLIBERALISM
Debates rage in the literature over whether neoliberalism brings benefits to society or
whether if it is in fact generally ruinous to those states that have implemented it.
Neoliberalism stands opposed to Keynesian economics in that it distrusts economic interven-
tion by the state. Specifically, neoliberalism tends to underplay the relative importance of
state-spending in order to ensure social cohesion through education and welfare programs as
well as the state provision of health services and the like, instead positing that these services
should be provided by the private sector. Larner (2000: 5) suggests that markets are under-
stood by neoliberals as “a better way of organizing economic activity because they are asso-
ciated with competition, economic efficiency and choice.” In other words, neoliberals argue
that a properly constituted free market will inevitably lead to the provision of more effective
goods than through attempts by the government to intervene.
In a more critical interpretation, David Harvey (2005: 159) has argued that the doctrine of
neoliberalism, or more accurately the process of neoliberalization, is one of “accumulation by
dispossession.” Accordingly, such a process has four stages: “privatization and commodifica-
tion . . . financialization . . . the management and manipulation of crises . . . [and] state redis-
tributions” (Harvey 2005: 160–163). That is, neoliberalism is a process opposed to the
progressive elements of the Keynesian welfare state. With its emphasis on the alleged efficien-
cies of competition, self-reliance, the private sector, and reductions in public spending as well
as it often being cloaked in a veil of patriotism, neoliberalism explicitly rejects notions of com-
munity, as best summed-up in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s now infamous dictum on
society: “There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families
and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first”
(Thatcher [1987] 2016). Decades later, scholars have suggested that this competitive individu-
alistic philosophy has been instituted through neoliberal policies (Braedley and Luxton 2010),
leading Loic Wacquant (2009: 306–307) to note that neoliberalism fosters a “cultural trope of
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individual responsibility which invades all spheres of life.” One area where this increased indi-
vidualism may have a negative impact on society is through an increase in violence.
NEOLIBERALISM AND VIOLENCE
As neoliberalism has spread across the globe throughout the last four decades, some have
argued that similar patterns of violence emerged as a result of leaving people’s economic and
social welfare to be determined primarily by market forces (Green 2011). Alvarado and
Massey (2010: 139) discuss this process, suggesting that violence is increasing in some parts
of the globe because of the consolidation of land ownership and the “mechanization of pro-
duction, which together create a population of economically marginalized and socially dis-
placed agrarian workers.” Alvarado and Massey (2010: 140) suggest that “these dislocations
are often accompanied by violent acts, as elites use force to impose market-oriented polices
from above and the poor resist these impositions.” The end result in many agricultural
nations is the loss of jobs, which pushes people into “various black-market activities, includ-
ing crime, as a means of survival” (Alvarado and Massey 2010: 140). In short, the expansion
of neoliberalization creates violence through the transformation of economies, similar to
what Durkheim (1893) observed during the industrial revolution. However, the unique nature
of neoliberalism, according to Alvarado and Massey (2010), encourages violence through the
top-down implementation of market-based polices that cause the numbers of marginalized
people to swell (see also Canterbury 2005; Springer 2009, 2011).
Research that links neoliberalism, violence, and crime often focuses on structural adjust-
ment programs (SAPs), loans nations receive from international financial institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), that require a set of neoliberal economic reforms the
receiving nation must implement that are designed to generate economic growth. These
reforms include “currency devaluation, the removal/reduction of the state from the workings
of the economy, the elimination of subsidies in an attempt to reduce expenditures, and trade
liberalisation” (Riddell 1992). Included in many SAPs are conditions that reduce employment
opportunities for the poor and cut government funding for education, health, and welfare pro-
grams, which research has demonstrated worsens human rights’ practices (Rodwan and
Cingranelli 2006). Examples of this are varied. Adekanye (1995) has shown how SAPs have
increased ethnic tensions in several African nations, while Kaiser (1996) links SAPs with
religious and racial tensions in Tanzania. Romo (2002) has argued that SAPs have caused
economic growth to slow, causing poverty, unemployment, and crime (including homicide)
to increase in Kenya, whereas Sanchez (2006) discovered a large increase in the crime rates
of Mexico and Costa Rica after structural adjustment. Increases in violence due to SAPs
have not only been found in street crimes; governments are also prone to upsurges in vio-
lence and criminal activity. Rodwan and Cingranelli (2006) found that the governments of
nations that receive SAPs were more likely to engage in torture, political imprisonment,
extrajudicial killing, and disappearances. In sum, research suggests that economic reforms
based on neoliberal thought may increase violence and crime. We posit that these findings
may extend to homicide.
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NEOLIBERALISM AND HOMICIDE
A longitudinal analysis of homicide data across the developed world demonstrates that over
the centuries homicide has become less prevalent. Homicide has consistently declined
through recent decades, although that decline is not universal. For example, the rate of homi-
cide began to increase in the United States during the 1970s, again peaking in the early
1990s before decelerating to rates characteristic of the 1950s. The spike in homicide coin-
cided with the advent of neoliberal policies in the 1980s under President Ronal Reagan in the
United States and Thatcher in the United Kingdom. During this period the competitive forces
of the market were unleashed in a manner not seen since the end of World War II and, argu-
ably, since the eve of World War I.
As a result of these neoliberal policies vast swaths of urban Britain were subject to market
discipline and saw their industries close. Once proud industrial settlements in the north of
England saw skilled work in engineering replaced by jobs in the tertiary sector at best, or, as
was often the case, the queue at the local unemployment office. Such an ideological experi-
ment was likewise conducted in the United States, and the fate of the rust belt, for example,
echoes the British experience in terms of its effects and social disintegration (Matthews,
Maume, and Miller 2001).
It was in such areas most negatively impacted by neoliberalism that a feeling of disen-
chantment took root. Life chances seemed minimal for individuals and their children. Hence,
neoliberalism sowed the seeds for general incivility and violence, sometimes leading to
homicide. In sum, the introduction of neoliberal policies in the United States and United
Kingdom in the 1980s is correlated with an “explosion” of crime, particularly violent crime
(Reiner 2007; Winlow and Hall 2006). It has been noted that under such conditions of socio-
economic disruption and competitive individualism caused by neoliberalism, increases in the
homicide rate might be expected (Hall and McLean 2009).
Nevertheless, there is a school of thought that claims that neoliberalism does not lead to
increased violence or incivility. It has been argued that neoliberalism alone does not explain
rising crime. Moreover, Bjørnskov (2015) has argued that there is no direct link between neo-
liberalism and homicide based on a panel study of US states.
The majority of literature on neoliberalism, however, suggests that a significantly greater
number of individuals show a tendency to become involved in more serious forms of vio-
lence as neoliberal policies are put into place. Therefore, we suggest the following hypoth-
esis, which we test in this work: Nations with higher neoliberalism scores will also have
higher homicide rates. We call this hypothesis the “cross-national neoliberalism-homi-
cide hypothesis.”
METHODS
We test the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis quantitatively by examining the statistical
relationship between neoliberalism and homicide using cross-national data and ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression analyses of homicide rates on neoliberalism index scores (Fraser
Institute’s Economic Freedom World Index [EFWI] and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of
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Economic Freedom [IEF]). We also examine the relationship between homicide and compo-
nents of each neoliberalism index to see if subcomponents of neoliberalism may be related to
homicide. OLS allows us to examine the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis while controlling
for other important variables that may also explain cross-national variation in homicide. As a
result, we provide a relatively demanding and exhaustive empirical examination of the neo-
liberalism-homicide hypothesis.
Data on neoliberalism, homicide, and controls are gathered for a sample of 142 nations
(see Appendix A). All of the variables used in our statistical models are described below.
Because cross-national crime data are notoriously difficult to gather, these 142 nations were
selected because of their data availability. We now turn to the description of those variables
and the approach used to test our hypothesis.
Dependent Variable
Homicide Rate. The dependent variable is the intentional homicide rate. Data on homicides
were obtained from the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide
Statistics Database (2014). These data measure all recorded “unlawful deaths purposefully
inflicted on a person by another person” (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2014: 109). The
number of homicides were then divided by the total resident population of each nation as
reported by the World Bank (2018). To aid in the interpretation of coefficients in our analysis
we multiplied this proportion by 100,000. The resulting variable represents the number of
homicides per 100,000 residents. Finally, to ensure an accurate picture of national homicide
rates we took the average annual homicide rate using three years of data (2013–2015). This
smoothing method helped diminish the statistical impact of outliers in our sample that are a
result of extreme annual fluctuations for any particular nation.
Independent Variable
Neoliberalism. To measure neoliberalism, we used the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom
World Index (EFWI) and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). The
EFWI “is an effort to identify how closely the institutions and policies of a nation correspond
with a limited government ideal, where the government protects property rights and arranges
for the provision of a limited set of ‘public goods’ such as national defense and access to
money of sound value, but little beyond these core functions” (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall
2015: 2). In other words, it measures the degree to which nations use trade and market insti-
tutes to allocate resources (Gwartney et al. 2015: 2), which is consistent with the tenets of
neoliberalism. The EFWI measures economic freedom in five areas—size of government,
legal system and security of property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally,
and regulation—and combines them into a single index score ranging from 0 (absence of
neoliberalism) to 10 (perfect neoliberalism). While the EFWI is not widely used by scholars,
it has nevertheless been used to study issues such as the relationships between economic free-
dom and foreign direct investment (Pearson, Nyonna, and Kim 2012) and government expen-
ditures (Sanz and Velazquez 2007). For the countries examined in this analysis, EFWI scores
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range from 3.3 (Venezuela) to 9.0 (Hong Kong), with a mean economic freedom score of 6.9
(std. dev. ¼ 0.97). The most neoliberal nations in these data according to the EFWI are Hong
Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand while the least neoliberal nations included in this ana-
lysis are Venezuela, Argentina, and the Republic of Congo.
The IEF measures the degree to which “individuals are free to work, produce, consume,
and invest in any way they please [and] the extent to which governments allow labor, capital,
and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the
extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself.” Again, this index is harmonious with
the neoliberal doctrine. The IEF covers 10 aspects of freedom in 2014: property rights, gov-
ernment integrity, tax burden, government spending, business freedom, labor freedom, mon-
etary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom. These 10 items are
combined into a single index score ranging from 0 (absence of neoliberalism) to 100 (perfect
neoliberalism). The IEF is widely used by researchers in the social sciences and has been ref-
erenced thousands of times in the academic literature (Miller and Holmes 2015). For the
countries examined in this analysis, IEF scores range from 1 (North Korea) to 90.1 (Hong
Kong), with a mean economic freedom score of 61.1 (std. dev. ¼ 11.6). The most neoliberal
nations in these data according to the IEF are Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia while
the least neoliberal nations included in this analysis are North Korea, Venezuela, and Eritrea
(Eastern Africa).
Control Variables
When we test the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis we control for other potential causes of
homicide rates identified as important in the previous cross-national literature. In particular,
we control for infant mortality, gross domestic product per capita, income inequality,
unemployment, democracy, population size, age structure, percentage of females, and urban-
ization. We describe each of these controls below.
Infant Mortality. Pridemore (2008, 2011) has made a convincing case that infant mortality
should be used as a measure of absolute deprivation (i.e., poverty) in cross-national homicide
studies. We include the infant mortality rate, the number of infants who die before age 1 per
1,000 live births, to control for the level of poverty in a nation (World Bank 2018).
GDP per Capita. To account for the level of economic modernization across countries,
we use each nation’s GDP per capita, measured in thousands of US dollars (World
Bank 2018).
Gini Index. The Gini index (World Bank 2018) is a frequently used measure of income
inequality (i.e., relative deprivation) in social science research. Due to the high degree of
missing Gini index data, we measure Gini in 2014 but replace missing index values with
Gini estimates for nations in 2013 or 2015 if such estimates exist.
Percentage Unemployed. Increases in unemployment have also been linked with cross-
national homicide rates (see Krohn 1976; Wilson 2001). We therefore include the percentage
of the population that is unemployed in 2014 in our analyses (World Bank 2018).
Democracy. Research has shown that a nation’s political structure may impact its amount
of homicide (Lin 2007; Stamatel 2009). To test the effect of democracy we use Freedom
House’s Political Rights Index (PRI) in 2014. The PRI is a seven-point scale measuring the
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level of democracy in a nation (1¼most democratic, 7¼ least democratic; Freedom House
2016). For interpretation purposes, we reverse-coded the PRI so that high values correspond
with more democratic nations.
Population Characteristics. We control for three population indicators in 2014 including
(1) the total annual population for each nation, (2) the percentage of the population age
0–14,1 and (3) the percentage of the population that is female (World Bank 2018).
Percentage Urban. We control for the percentage of a nation’s population that live in
urban areas in 2014 (World Bank 2018). Previous studies have found that urbanization and
homicide rates are positively related (e.g., Fischer 1975; Hoskin 2001). Additionally, changes
in urbanization can be conceptualized as another measure of modernization. As nations mod-
ernize, more people live in cities where the majority of economic opportunities are located,
compared to rural areas.
Analytic Strategy
To test the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion analysis of homicide rates on the EFWI and IEF neoliberalism indexes as well as the
major components of each index. The models are estimated using Stata (V13). An examin-
ation of OLS diagnostics suggests that the major statistical assumptions needed to use this
procedure are satisfied. First, the models produced normally distributed residuals when the
average homicide rate was logged. Moreover, there is little evidence of heteroscedasticity in
the models estimated in Tables 1 and 2. Our initial inspection of the correlation matrix
(Appendix B) and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores suggest that multicollinearity is also
not a problem for the models we estimate. Specifically, the largest bivariate correlation we
observed for any of the dependent variables was 0.89 (between percentage 0–14 years old
and infant mortality). As a result, to determine if multicollinearity might be a problem when
these two variables were simultaneously used to predict homicide, we estimated the models
removing democracy. The model without democracy produced substantively similar results
to those reported in Table 1, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem in these data
in the models we estimate. However, notes that variance inflation factor (VIF) scores greater
than four may indicate harmful multicollinearity, a condition that may inflate standard errors
and produce unstable coefficients. Thus, we also examined the VIF scores for all models.
The only VIF score that exceeded four was for the variable percentage young (VIF ¼ 8.1).
However, when percentage young was removed from the model, none of the remaining VIF
scores exceeded 3.3 and the average VIF score across all models dropped to a modest 2.1;
the coefficients and standard errors in the models remained stable. As a result, we suggest
that multicollinearity is not a problem for this particular cross-national analysis.
We begin our statistical examination of the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis by estimat-
ing four cross-national homicide models. Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 estimate only the effects
of EFWI (Model 1) and IEF (Model 2) on homicide rates. Models 3 and 4 include these two
neoliberalism indicators along with all of the control variables to predict homicide rates. The
models in Tables 2 and 3 contain OLS regressions of each neoliberalism indicator on homi-
cide rates controlling for infant mortality, GDP per capita, Gini index, percentage
unemployed, population, percentage 0–14 years old, percentage Female, percentage Urban,
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and Democracy. The results for control variables are not presented in these tables for simpli-
city (but are available on request). However, the coefficients and standard errors for these
control variables remain essentially identical to those presented in Table 1 (Models 3 and 4).
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the results of the four OLS models of homicide rate. We will focus our inter-
pretations on the neoliberalism indicators. In Table 1 Model 1, the IEF is negatively associ-
ated with homicide rates (b ¼ 0.449; p< 0.05), suggesting that an increase in economic
freedom on the order of a 1-unit change across nations for this particular 100-point
neoliberalism index is associated with a decrease in the natural log of homicide rates
of approximately 0.045. This finding is statistically significant and contrary to the
TABLE 1
OLS Regression of the Natural Log of Homicide on Neoliberalism and Controls (2014)
Natural log of homicide
Model 1
Heritage (IEF)
Model 2
Frasier (EFWI)
Model 3 Heritage
& Controls
Model 4 Frasier
& Controls
Coef. (Std. Error) Coef. (Std. Error) Coef. (Std. Error) Coef. (Std. Error)
Neoliberalism 0.0449 0.603 0.00130 0.0609
(0.00839) (0.105) (0.0126) (0.129)
Infant mortality 0.0128 0.0110
(0.00783) (0.00867)
GDP per capita 0.0247 0.0258
(0.00701) (0.00702)
Gini index 0.0632 0.0629
(0.0117) (0.0120)
% unemployed 0.0150 0.0171
(0.0134) (0.0141)
Population 0.000241 0.000244
(0.000421) (0.000429)
% 0–14 years old 0.0588 0.0562
(0.0191) (0.0200)
% female 0.216 0.216
(0.0723) (0.0756)
% urban 0.0142 0.0161
(0.00533) (0.00592)
Democracy 0.0419 0.0600
(0.0620) (0.0651)
Constant 4.003 5.392 13.76 14.19
(0.522) (0.732) (3.992) (4.163)
Nations 1351 1252 93 90
R2 0.177 0.210 0.714 0.713
1When Model 1 is estimated using only the 93 nations in Model 3, the regression coefficient for neoliberalism is
0.0513 (se ¼ 0.0121; t¼ 4.42; p< 0.001).2
2When Model 1 is estimated using only the 90 nations in Model 4, the regression coefficient for neoliberalism is
0.4494 (se ¼ 0.0138; t¼ 3.65; p< 0.001).
p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
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neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis. Here it appears that neoliberalism’s effort to promote
more expansive individual freedoms has a positive (crime reduction) impact on homicide
across nations. We discover similar evidence for the EFWI. Specifically, in Model 2 the cor-
relation between neoliberalism and homicide rates is also negative and significant (b ¼
0.603; p< 0.05).2 We see that across nations an increase in neoliberalism on the order of 1
TABLE 2
OLS Coefficients and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for the Natural Log of Homicide on Ten
Subcomponents of the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom (2014)1
Natural log of homicide
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Property rights Government integrity Tax burden Government spending Business freedom
Neoliberalism 0.00573 0.0131 0.0152 0.00494 0.00104
(0.00609) (0.00673) (0.00688) (0.00454) (0.00776)
Constant 13.17 11.97 15.70 14.26 13.90
(3.973) (3.965) (3.887) (3.900) (3.947)
Nations 92 94 94 94 94
R2 0.716 0.725 0.728 0.716 0.712
Natural log of homicide
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Labor freedom Monetary freedom Trade freedom Investment freedom Financial freedom
Neoliberalism 0.000507 0.00542 0.000855 0.00159 0.00200
(0.00470) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.00542) (0.00581)
Constant 13.98 13.37 13.71 13.76 13.83
(3.918) (4.119) (3.944) (3.928) (3.941)
Nations 94 94 93 93 93
R2 0.712 0.713 0.714 0.714 0.714
1All models are adjusted for infant mortality, GDP per capita, Gini index, percentage unemployed, Population,
percentage 0–14 years old, percentage female, percentage urban, and democracy.
p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
TABLE 3
OLS Coefficients and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for the Natural Log of Homicide on Five
Subcomponents of the Frasier Economic Freedom of the World Index (2014).1
Natural log of homicide
Model 1:
Legal System
Model 2: Size
of Government
Model 3: Security
of Property Rights
Model 4:
Sound Money
Model 5: Freedom
to Trade
Neoliberalism 0.147 0.138 0.0221 0.0177 0.0282
(0.0860) (0.0613) (0.0836) (0.0889) (0.109)
Constant 12.69 15.33 13.84 13.91 13.65
(4.056) (4.014) (4.083) (4.128) (4.113)
Nations 90 90 90 90 90
R2 0.723 0.730 0.713 0.713 0.713
1All models are adjusted for infant mortality, GDP per capita, Gini index, percentage unemployed, Population, per-
centage 0–14 years old, percentage female, percentage urban, and democracy.
p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
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unit is associated with a decrease in the natural log of homicide rates of approximately 0.6
(p< 0.05). This finding is, again, contrary to the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis, but
fairly consistent with the results in Model 2. Once controls are added to the cross-national
analysis (Model 3), the IEF and EFWI can no longer be considered adequate predictors of
homicide. Therefore, based on the data in Table 1 that shows no association between overall
neoliberalism scores and homicide rates when controls are included in the analysis, neo-
liberalism-homicide hypothesis 1 is not supported.
We investigate the relationship between neoliberalism and homicide in more detail by
replicating Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 for each subcomponent of neoliberalism. The first
set of results are for the IEF and are presented in Table 2, Models 1 to 10. These results
examine the individual effects of each of the following components of the IEF: (1) property
rights, (2) government integrity, (3) tax burden, (4) government spending, (5) business
freedom, (6) labor freedom, (7) monetary freedom, (8) trade freedom, (9) investment free-
dom, and (10) financial freedom. In all cases larger scores represent more neoliberal
nations on that particular indicator. These results are interesting and suggest a more
nuanced interpretation of the relationship between neoliberalism and homicide. In particu-
lar, coefficients are both positive and negative across different indicators. One particular
indicator, tax burden, is statistically significant (p< 0.05). Tax burden measures direct
taxes “in terms of the top marginal tax rates on individual and corporate incomes, and over-
all taxes, including all forms of direct and indirect taxation at all levels of government, as a
percentage of GDP.” This score is reverse-coded (i.e., subtracted from 100) so that the
higher the score, the more freedom and the less tax burden relative to GDP. Model 3 sug-
gests that nations with higher neoliberal tax burdens also tend to have higher homicide
rates, even when controlling for other variables known to be correlated with homicide
(b¼ 0.152). This finding provides partial support for the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis
in that it suggests threats to the welfare state may limit government spending in ways that
promote violent crime. While other neoliberal coefficients in Table 2 are both positive and
negative, none are statistically significant.
The second set of results are for the EFWI and are presented in Table 3, Models 1 to 5.
These results examine EFWI subscores: (1) size of government, (2) legal system and security
of property rights, (3) sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation.
The only neoliberalism subindicator that is statistically significant in any of the models is
size of government, which indicates a nation’s reliance on politics to allocate resources,
goods, and services. Thus, this indicator taps the degree to which markets, rather than gov-
ernment budgets and nations that score higher in this subcategory, tend to have lower levels
of government spending, a smaller government, and lower marginal tax rates. Again, as a
nation adopts more neoliberal polices, this score increases. Model 2 (Table 3) suggests that
across nations, as government size becomes more neoliberal, the homicide rate increases
(b¼ 0.138, p< 0.05) even when controlling for other variables that are known to predict
cross-national homicide rates. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table 2 and,
again, provides partial support for the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis in that it suggests
that threats to the welfare state may promote homicide. Again, while other neoliberal coeffi-
cients in Table 2 are both positive and negative, none of the other four neoliberal indicators
are statistically significant.
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Taken together Tables 1, 2, and 3 paint a rather particular interpretation of the relationship
between neoliberalism and homicide. That is, examining the neoliberalism-homicide hypoth-
esis is not as straightforward as we imagined. For example, some aspects of neoliberalism
may be positively related to homicide, while other aspects negatively or unrelated to homi-
cide. The OLS analysis of the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis suggests that it is only gov-
ernment spending and government size that matter and seem to be positively related to
homicide, even after testing each indicator individually and controlling for other variables
known to predict homicide rates. To investigate this issue in more detail we conducted add-
itional post hoc analyses to examine a potential causal model of neoliberalism on homicide.
That is, as we noted previously, neoliberal policies tend to undermine the welfare state by
limiting social welfare programs and reducing spending. Therefore, we focus on government
size and spending to see if neoliberalism may be impacting income inequality and poverty,
which in turn may be correlated with homicide. While we did not specifically hypothesize
that these particular relationships existed in our data, such a finding would be supported in
the literature.
POST HOC ANALYSIS
The diversity of findings concerning neoliberal subindicators in Tables 2 and 3 provide some
important observations concerning the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis and suggest a start-
ing point for additional post hoc analysis. We therefore draw upon our previous findings to
examine the potential for income inequality (Gini) and poverty (infant mortality) to act as
mediating factors between neoliberalism subindicators and homicide rates. This potential
relationship, while never directly specified empirically or theoretically, is consistent with the
literature on potential reasons that neoliberalism and homicide may be related. We do this
through a series of path models (not shown) that estimate the direct and indirect of effects of
neoliberal subindicators on homicide. While we tested these mediating relationships on each
neoliberalism indicator to determine if suppression or mediation effects might emerge, we
present findings only for statistically significant results. Moreover, we focus on the potential
mediating variables Gini and infant mortality since, theoretically, neoliberalism is believed to
create both inequality and poverty, which in turn are believed to be related to homicide.
When we included percentage unemployed in the models it was not related to homicide or
neoliberal indexes. As a result, it was dropped from further analyses. We estimate each
potential mediating model and find that only three neoliberal subindicators may be mediated
by Gini and infant mortality: (1) government spending, (2) tax burden from the EFI, and (3)
government size from the EFWI.
We present these results in two path models below (estimated by SEM in Stata V13) and
emphasize their exploratory nature. Our analysis begins with Figure 1. That model diagrams
the standardized coefficients for paths between government spending, tax burden, Gini, infant
mortality and homicide. All paths in Figure 1 are statistically significant (p< 0.05), except
the path between tax burden and poverty. As predicted by previous cross-national studies,
both Gini and infant mortality are positive predictors of homicide rates. Moreover, as we dis-
covered in Table 2, government spending has a direct and positive effect on homicide rates.
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That is, as government spending becomes more neoliberal, homicide rates increase (beta ¼
0.49, p< 0.05). However, Figure 1 also indicates that government spending has an indirect
effect on homicide through income Gini and poverty (infant mortality). That is, as govern-
ment spending becomes more neoliberal, income inequality (beta ¼ 0.3, p< 0.05) and infant
mortality (beta ¼ 0.87, p< 0.05) increase. This increase, in turn, is positively related to
homicide rates (beta Gini¼ 0.54, p< 0.05; beta infant mortality¼ 0.17, p< 0.15), suggesting
an indirect impact of neoliberalism on homicide. Thus, it appears that as government spend-
ing becomes more neoliberal in nature it increases homicide directly and indirectly. This
exploratory finding is consistent with theoretical interpretations of neoliberalism that suggest
it promotes high levels of income inequality (Rodwan and Cingranelli 2006) and economic
deprivation (Chomsky 1999) as well as research on homicide suggesting an association
between relative deprivation, absolute derivation, and homicide (Pratt and Godsey 2003).
The results in Figure 1 for tax burden are also interesting, and they elaborate on the find-
ings in Table 2. Specifically, while more neoliberal tax policy appears to increase income
inequality (beta ¼ 0.66, p< 0.05), which leads to more homicide, it also directly reduces
homicide (beta ¼ 0.41). Thus, in the path model we have diagramed that the total impact
of neoliberal taxes on homicide appears relatively insignificant (i.e., total direct and indirect
standardized effect ¼ 0.05). That is, unlike neoliberal government spending, which appears
to be directly and indirectly counterproductive, when it comes to homicide rates neoliberal
tax policy may be indirectly harmful but directly beneficial. The suggestion that neoliberal
indicators may have contradictory impacts on homicide (i.e., serve as suppressor variables)
makes an examination of the effect of neoliberalism on homicide complex at best.
The results of government size, Gini, infant mortality, and homicide are presented in the
path model in Figure 2. Again, the results paint an interesting relationship between neo-
liberalism and homicide rates. Specifically, it is the indirect impact of government size on
homicide that is important. That is, as government size (a combination of spending, taxes,
and services) becomes more neoliberal, both income inequality (Gini; beta ¼ 0.94, p< 0.05)
and poverty (infant mortality; beta ¼ 0.54, p< 0.54) increase. As in Figure 1, both Gini and
infant mortality are associated with an increase in homicide rates across nations. Again, this
finding is partially consistent with the variable government spending in Figure 1 and suggests
FIGURE 1 Path model of the hypothesized relationship between neoliberal tax policies and spending, income inequal-
ity, infant mortality, and homicide rates, 2014.
Results for the path analysis (N¼ 90). Standardized coefficients are presented.  ¼ significant at p< 0.05. Chi-square ¼
0.59 (df ¼ 1); root mean square error of approximation ¼ 0.001; Comparative Fit Index, CFI ¼ 0.99; e ¼ error.
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that the impact of neoliberalism on homicide is likely complex and occurs through economic
outcomes that are a product of government policies. Finally, we emphasize that these results
should be viewed with caution as they are specific to these particular nations at this particular
time (2014). How these models might look if estimated using other data of neoliberalism and
homicide is open to investigation. However, these results suggest a starting point for
future studies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In these analyses we draw upon the theoretical literature on neoliberalism and homicide to
suggest a cross-national neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis that we tested empirically using
cross-national data and neoliberal indexes from the Fraser Institute and the Heritage
Foundation in combination with homicide data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. We
find partial support for that hypothesis. Specifically, while overall indexes of neoliberalism
are unrelated to homicide rates when control variables are included in the analysis, two sub-
indicators of neoliberalism are related: government size (from the EFWI) and tax burden
(from the IEF). Both of these indicators appear to add some explanatory power to our cross-
national homicide models and are consistent with critical examinations of neoliberalism.
When we explore the relationships between neoliberalism indexes and their subindicators
and homicide in more detail, we discover that three neoliberalism indicators stand out as
being potentially important: government size (from the EFWI) as well as tax burden and
Government Spending (from the IEF). These three neoliberalism indicators appear to have
indirect effects on homicide rates across nations. In particular, as nations become more neo-
liberal in their government spending, government size, and tax burden, their economic
inequality (as measured by Gini) increases. These increases in Gini are then correlated with
increases in homicide. This finding is similar to that for government spending and tax burden
in the case of poverty (infant mortality). That is, as government spending and tax burden
FIGURE 2 Path model of the hypothesized relationship between neoliberal government size, income inequality, infant
mortality, and homicide rates, 2014.Results for the path analysis (N¼ 90). Standardized coefficients are presented. 
¼ significant at p< 0.05. Chi-square ¼ 0.59 (df ¼ 1); root mean square error of approximation ¼ 0.001;
Comparative Fit Index, CFI ¼ 0.99; e ¼ error.
Results for the path analysis (N¼ 90). Standardized coefficients are presented.  ¼ significant at p< 0.05. Chi-square ¼
1.23 (df ¼ 1); root mean square error of approximation ¼ 0.04; Comparative Fit Index, CFI ¼ 0.99; e ¼ error.
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become more neoliberal nations appear to have higher rates of infant mortality, which, in
turn, appears to have a positive influence on homicide. We find, however, that the direct
effects of tax burden on homicide rates are negative, suggesting that it could reduce homicide
as it becomes more neoliberal across nations. When combined with the indirect effects, the
total impact of a neoliberal tax structure is negligible in these models.
What do our results mean? First, it appears that general statements about the relationship
between neoliberalism and homicide are inappropriate. In particular, it appears that much of
the potential impact of neoliberalism on homicide rates that we uncover has to do with neo-
liberal government policies concerning size, expenditures, and taxes on economic inequality
and poverty. This suggests that governments adopting these sets of policies may be uninten-
tionally creating conditions for higher rates of homicide. Thus, we recommend that future
studies focus more empirical attention on these particular indicators at different points of
time, over time, and within nations to make more substantial policy recommendations.
Second, we caution readers with respect to the potential OLS regression and path models we
produce. These models need to be viewed in the context of the data on which they are based.
It might be that the neoliberal changes that have occurred worldwide over the past half cen-
tury have already had an impact on homicide and it is only now, in later neoliberal stages,
that government policies regarding size of government, spending, and taxes are having an
additional impact on homicide. That is, by 2014 many nations had already fully adopted neo-
liberal policies that might be hypothesized to generate the initial increase in homicide. As a
result, the large impact of neoliberal policies on violence may be left unanalyzed.
Unfortunately, the lack of available reliable data makes it difficult to determine the nature of
the relationship between neoliberalism and homicide within nations over the past half cen-
tury. However, we recognize that such a relationship might exist. As a result, we can there-
fore not rule out that other subindicators of neoliberalism may demonstrate an associate if
measured at a different time in history.
In the end, our analysis lends partial support to the literature that suggests neoliberalism
and the government policies crafted based on this philosophy will lead to more violence in
the form of homicide (e.g., Adekanye 1995; Harvey 2005; Kaiser 1996; Rodwan and
Cingranelli 2006; Romo 2002; Sanchez 2006). We believe that this analysis is important
because it helps specify which aspects of neoliberalism may matter and therefore may pave
the way for future studies of neoliberalism and homicide.
Specifically, as we have pointed out, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) argue that the
emphasis on noneconomic institutions combined with the weakening of social controls asso-
ciated with noneconomic social institutions may lead to higher homicide rates. We suggest
that neoliberalism indicators associated with diminished government size, lower government
spending, and “tax cuts” tend to also be justified based on the value of economic efficiency
and growth. Such policies, we argue, lead to conditions of poverty and inequality that have
long been associated with homicide. Importantly, these neoliberal policies that tend to reduce
government size and spending also serve to shrink many of the government-supported social
institutions and programs that may prevent violence. As a result, we see our hypothesis as
providing further context and additional evidence for neo-Marxist and economic inequality
theories such as Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) institutional anomie theory that points out
how the devastation of noneconomic institutions may be related to crime.
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We would like to acknowledge two important limitations to our study. First, cross-
national homicide studies often suffer from missing data. Missing data have significant
implications for our analysis of the neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis. That is, the sample
we examine is as low as 90 nations in some of the models we estimated (e.g., Model 4,
Table 1 and Table 3) because of missing data on homicide, economic inequality, and/or
neoliberalism indicators. Given that there are 195 countries in existence, our theoretical
proposition that neoliberalism increases homicide should be subject to considerable scru-
tiny and skepticism as a result of missing data. The reason for this is simple: the nations
we study that are listed in Appendix A are disproportionately modernized Western nations.
Nations that do not appear in Appendix A tend to have higher than average levels of eco-
nomic inequality, poverty, and violence (Neapolitan 1997). However, these very same
countries may also have lower scores on neoliberalism indicators. Take nations in Africa
as an example. Many African countries are not “modernized” in the orthodox sense of the
term. For instance, Moore (2001: 910) argues that global forces in many African countries
are different from the rest of the world in that “capitalism and modernity are starting over
again.” This traditional development and high levels of inequality may lead to elevated
levels of violence. As a result, African countries that are not listed in Appendix A may
be theoretically unique in that they tend to score low on neoliberalism but high on vio-
lence. Future researchers might examine this issue in greater detail as an exception to the
neoliberalism-homicide hypothesis.
Second, while the Economic Freedom of the World Index and the Index of Economic
Freedom are likely to reflect the concept of neoliberalism, they were not created to specific-
ally measure this concept. Instead, both indexes were created for policy-making purposes
rather than social science purposes. Moreover, some scholars observe that the operationaisa-
tion of neoliberalism needs to be more carefully considered (e.g., d’Albergo 2016). As a
result, we suggest that future research could focus on analyzing the relationship between neo-
liberalism and homicide by constructing and examining alternative measures of
neoliberalism.
We conclude by suggesting that neoliberalism is one of the most salient features of the
world economy over the last four decades. Research has demonstrated that neoliberal policies
can lead to increases in violent behavior. We find that when it comes to some specific gov-
ernment policies, higher levels of neoliberalism on those indicators are directly and indirectly
associated with higher homicide rates between nations, providing some support to that body
of literature. We encourage future research that seeks to further unpack the relationship
between neoliberalism and violence because national governments, international financial
institutions, and multinational corporations have ensured that the neoliberal agenda is here to
stay for the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1. The original models also included percentage of the population age 15–64; however, it needed to be
removed due to multicollinearity. Replacing the percentage 0–14 years old with the percentage 15–64 does not
meaningfully change the results. Additionally, to measure the noneconomic aspects of the modernization process,
we created a principle component index of the following variables: life expectancy, internet users per 1,000,
telephones per 1,000 people, and energy consumption measured as kilograms of oil equivalent to energy use per
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capita (World Bank 2018). The modernization indicator, however, was highly collinear with other independent
variables and was therefore removed from the models.
2. This EFWI is measured on a 10-point scale (rather than the 100-point scale for the IEF) and therefore the
coefficient for the EFWI should be 10 times larger than the coefficient for the IEF.
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A. List of nations in the analysis (n¼ 142)
Albania Czech Republic Jordan Republic of Korea
Algeria South Korea Kazakhstan Republic of Moldova
Angola Denmark Kenya Romania
Argentina Djibouti Kosovo Russian Federation
Armenia Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda
Australia Ecuador Lao PDR Samoa
Austria El Salvador Latvia Saudi Arabia
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Lebanon Senegal
Bangladesh Eritrea Libya Serbia
Barbados Estonia Liechtenstein Sierra Leone
Belarus Ethiopia Lithuania Singapore
Belgium Finland Luxembourg Slovak Republic
Belize France Macedonia, FYR Slovenia
Benin Gabon Maldives Somalia
Bhutan Gambia Mali South Africa
Bosnia & Herzegovina Georgia Malta Spain
Brazil Germany Mauritania Sri Lanka
Brunei Darussalam Greece Mexico Sudan
Bulgaria Guatemala Micronesia Suriname
Burundi Guinea Mongolia Swaziland
Cabo Verde Guinea-Bissau Montenegro Sweden
Cameroon Guyana Morocco Switzerland
Canada Honduras Myanmar Tajikistan
Central African Republic Hong Kong Nepal Tanzania
Chad Hungary Netherlands Thailand
Chile Iceland New Zealand Togo
China India Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Colombia Indonesia Norway Turkmenistan
Comoros Iran Panama Uganda
Congo, Dem. R. Iraq Paraguay United Arab Emirates
Congo, Rep. of Ireland Peru United Kingdom
Costa Rica Israel Philippines United States
Cote d'Ivoire Italy Poland Uruguay
Croatia Jamaica Portugal Uzbekistan
Cyprus Japan Qatar Vanuatu
Venezuela
Yemen
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B. Pearson product moment correlations (r) for variables in the analysis
C. Descriptive statistics for variables in the analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Ln homicide rate 1.00
2. IEF 0.40 1.00
3. EFWI 0.37 0.88 1.00
4. Infant mortality 0.45 0.65 0.64 1.00
5. GDP per capita 0.60 0.67 0.55 0.64 1.00
6. Gini 0.70 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.43 1.00
7. % unemployed 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.08 1.00
8. Population 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.15 1.00
9. % 0–14 years old 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.89 0.66 0.47 0.33 0.03 1.00
10. % female 0.02 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.30 0.37 1.00
11. % urban 0.22 0.52 0.34 0.63 0.66 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.60 0.60 1.00
12. Democracy 0.41 0.71 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.64 0.25 0.60 1.00
Variable Observations Mean Standard Min. Max.
Ln homicide rate 142 1.26 1.21 1.31 4.29
Homicide rate 142 7.37 11.55 0.27 73.41
IEF 135 61.12 11.57 1.00 90.10
Property 136 44.23 25.49 5.00 95.00
Government 140 40.54 23.18 5.00 94.00
Tax burden 139 76.88 14.47 0.00 99.90
Spending 139 62.03 23.82 0.00 93.60
Business 139 65.82 17.64 0.00 98.90
Labor 139 61.62 17.13 0.00 97.20
Money 139 73.82 9.88 0.00 87.50
Trade 137 75.45 13.13 0.00 90.00
Investment 139 57.55 23.94 0.00 95.00
Financial 137 50.88 19.57 0.00 90.00
EFWI 125 6.88 0.97 3.28 8.99
Government 125 6.38 1.34 3.46 9.46
Legal 125 5.34 1.67 1.62 8.88
Money 125 8.42 1.30 3.19 9.84
Trade 125 7.18 1.30 2.99 9.49
Regulation 125 7.06 1.03 3.04 9.42
Infant mortality 139 22.96 22.46 1.70 93.50
GDP per capita 137 20.82 21.33 0.63 127.31
Gini 97 37.04 7.83 25.60 63.40
% unemployed 139 8.60 6.01 0.20 29.60
Population 141 45.29 161.71 0.04 1364.27
% 0–14 years old 139 26.98 10.74 11.06 48.50
% female 139 50.03 3.33 24.39 54.13
% urban 140 59.32 22.88 8.55 100.00
Democracy 141 3.33 2.03 1.00 7.00
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